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• Interested in examining economies where 
agents face risk of loss with some probability
• One example is a flood-prone community
• There may exist a public good that can affect 
the probability that the agents in a community 
experience a loss
• Examples include levies, damsPareto efficient provision of Public 
goods
• Identifying and implementing Pareto efficient 
levels of public goods under uncertainty is 
challenging for several reasons:
– Often agents have incentive to misrepresent their 
preferences for the public good to attempt to free-
ride.
– Unaware of any mechanism design work focused on 
the provision of public goods under uncertainty
– Need complete markets (insurance) to achieve Pareto 
efficiency.Complexity of Insurance
• Insurance markets are traditionally handled in 
economic theory with Arrow-Debreu 
securities, one security for each unique set of 
endowments in the economy.
• Problem: With certain kinds of risk, number of 
states of the economy can grow 
unmanageably large as the number of agents 
increase. Real-life insurance bears little 
resemblance to Arrow-Debreu securities.Risk: Definitions
• Suppose there is an economy with N agents 
and that there are M possible states of nature 
each agent can experience. The number of 
states of the economy will depend on N, M 
and the type of risk that is presents.Types of Risks
• Joint Risk: All agents experience the same state of the world.
• Graduated Risk: Agents live in an ordered environment, a river valley for example, 
and the loss each agent suffers can be no greater than the agents in a lower state 
in the ordered environment. 
• Idiosyncratic Risk: Each agent can experience any of the possible states of world. 
This doesn’t have to be a completely independent process, risks can be correlated, 
but there must be some element of idiosyncratic or individual risk involved.Computational Complexity
• Joint Risk: M states. Does not depend on 
number of agents, just the states of nature M.
• Graduate Risk: Defined recursively as 
• Idiosyncratic Risk: N*MN. Number of states of 
the economy grows exponentially with the 
number of agentsLimiting Behavior
• For graduated risk, the limiting behavior is 
such that the number of states of the 
economy increases in polynomial fashion with 
the order of the polynomial given by M-1. 
Thus, for M=2 the problem is linear. M=3 is 
quadratic etc.Current practice
• Army Corp of Engineers is responsible for 
constructing most flood control projects
• Complex cost-benefit rules are used to 
determine which projects are undertaken. 
• Flood insurance is provided via separate 
agency, part of the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. Desired alternative
• Would be useful if the insurance component 
of the problem and the public good 
component could be combined as the two 
decisions are related. Part of the demand for a 
levee could come from risk aversion. This 
would make flood an insurance and a levy 
substitutes. Insurer likely to have strong 
preferences over levee height as it affects 
premiums.FEMA meets the Army Corp of 
Engineers
• What if we allowed a monopoly insurer to pick 
premiums for agents and allowed the insurer 
to provide the public good out money 
received from the premiums?
• Theory of the second best: with one market 
failure (public good) adding a second (market 
power) may be welfare improvingRationale
• Insurer has strong incentive to provide and 
maintain the public good because it decreases 
the probability of having to pay out claims
• Only one price is necessary, so efficient with 
information
• Monopoly insurer can fund public good 
provision out of revenue from insurance 
premiums (ability to pay)Single priced contracts
• We restrict the insurance company to selling 
single-priced contracts. That is, the premium 
an agent pays doesn’t not depend on the 
realizations experienced by other agents (not 
Arrow-Debreu). However, there is a risk that 
the insurance company will default and not 
pay your claim at all. Default risk
• Tradeoffs with single priced contracts:
– Limits number of prices in markets
– Agents don’t need to trust or verify claims made by 
other agents, only required to trust insurance 
company
• Disadvantages
– In a sufficiently bad year, no way to avoid default
– Assume there is a government regulator who sets 
maximum probability of default. Insurance companies 
must make decisions to ensure probability of default 
doesn’t exceed threshold. Simple example
• Insurer surprises agents with public good
• Future work to look at mechanism design
• To simplify mathematical model, assume 
agents face idiosyncratic riskProblem details
• Logarithmic utility: u = ln (c)
• Each agent has endowment of 1
• Loss of 0.5 with probability p(δ) = .1-.05 δ.5
• Cost function is C(δ) = 5 δ2
• Limit on default risk, α, is the exogenous 
parameterAgents’ problem
• Alpha is probability of 
default
• P is probability of loss
• C is insurance premium
• I is quantity of insurance 
purchased
• D is loss due to bad 
outcome occuringInsurer’s problem
• Maximize profit subject to a default constraint
• With idiosyncratic risk, probability of paying out a 
given number of claims is governed by binomial 
distribution
• Breakeven point:Insurer’s problem cont
• Solvency constraint is given byInsurer’s problem cont
s.t.Public good as a function of αUtility as a function of αExpected profit as a function of αConclusion
• Provision of public goods under uncertainty 
presents both mechanism design and 
computational challenges
• Only a limited literature exists in this area
• Numerical simulations indicate a tradeoff 
between solvency  and utility.